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The City's View

Sitting back, feet propped up on a cluttered wooden
desk, clad casually in well worn loafers, dark corduroy
slacks, and a plaid shirt open at the neck, Steve Clifford
reflects on his last two years at the helm of perhaps the
biggest municipal accounting project ever undertaken.
And he makes it seem so easy.
"We simply had the mandate," he says. "There was no
alternative. It had to work, that's all."
As a special deputy in the New York City comptroller's
office, Clifford's task these past two years has been to act
as a director of that city's integrated financial management
system (IFMS). Devising the system, which went on line
July 1 at the beginning of the 1977-78 fiscal year, was under
the direction of Clifford and co-director David Woodbridge of the mayor's office, the pair working closely with
five independent consulting firms.
Frank Zolfo, New York partner and the Touche Ross
project director from 7-1-76 to 7-31-77, characterizes the
development of IFMS as "motivated by the city's need to
improve its procedures for obtaining timely, reliable financial information and for controlling its revenues and
expenditures."
Essentially, the objectives of the new system were fourfold: (1) to facilitate improved financial management of
the city's resources by each agency; (2) to exercise sound
budgetary and accounting control over city revenues and
expenses; (3) to report financial information accurately to
city managers, federal and state officials, the investment
community, and the general public; and (4) to develop an
auditabie system, one which will ultimately enable an
independent auditor to render a clean opinion.
And it was anything but easy. Putting such a system together involved close cooperation between the mayor's office and the comptroller's office, the diligence of close to
1,000 municipal personnel involved in the project, more
than 500,000 man-hours of support work among the five
consultants, and a cost to the city of more than $76 million.
"At the outset," says Clifford, "the city's financial systems were a shambles. That was recognized by any number of people at the state and federal levels. As the city's
fiscal crisis heated up in 1975, these people began asking
for certain types of information, and the city just couldn't
produce that information. It became painfully evident that
the city really didn't have a hold on its own budgetary
systems, accounting systems, or control systems. It was
pure chaos."

The first step to alleviate that chaos came with the
issuance of a white paper from the comptroller's office in
June, 1975, calling for a new accounting system. But what
really got IFMS under way was the state's passage of legislation that same year establishing the Municipal Assistance
Corporation (MAC). This legislation required the city to
reform its accounting and budgeting systems to conform
to standards acceptable to the state comptroller.
"However, the M A C law spoke only to accounting,"
Clifford recalls, "whereas the big problem in the city was
the lack of control and the lack of information. Accounting is an after-the-fact kind of thing, and, after the fact, if
we had enough accountants we could probably put together proper statements on an annual basis without
changing the system. But nobody knew this at the time,
certainly not the appropriating bodies."
Woodbridge and Clifford, therefore, ordered a system
to be designed that would simultaneously meet the city's
needs for financial control, planning analysis, and accountability—with an emphasis on control. The scope of
the project would encompass most citywide financial
management functions, such as budgeting, payroll, purchasing (encumbrance control), accounting (including accounts receivable, accounts payable, and warrant reconciliation), and financial reporting of all kinds. The plan
called for IFMS to operate as a unified system. Citywide
budgeting, accounting, purchasing, and payroll functions
would be brought together in a single computer facility at
the new financial information services agency (FISA).
Each major subsystem (such as payroll) would be able to
access data from a single data base that would also hold
information from the other subsystems (such as budgeting). Thus the need for payroll to maintain its own separate
version of the budget would be eliminated. Moreover,
account coding in the budgeting and accounting subsystems would be identical, greatly simplifying agency coding
on vouchers and comparisons of budgeted to actual
performance.
There seemed little question in anyone's mind that the
project could succeed. What bothered most people was
the time frame imposed by that M A C legislation, which
called for an auditable system as of July 1,1977. That gave
co-directors Woodbridge and Clifford scarcely more than
a year and a half to put their program in working order.
Woodbridge, however, feels the compressed time frame
may have been a blessing in disguise.

"What happens in the public sector as well as in the
private sector," says the conservatively dressed, baldish,
40-year-old systems expert on loan from Chase Manhattan, "is that the amount of work needed for completion
of a given project will always expand to fill the amount of
time allotted for it. In this case, there was a tight deadline
and everyone knew it. We either got the job done or we
didn't. So we broke all the rules of the book and got away
with it because there was no other way. We'd give city
management a chance to be involved in every decision,
for example, but if the people didn't respond quickly
enough we went ahead and implemented the decision on
our own."
Woodbridge's sentiments are echoed by Kenneth S.
Axelson, then deputy mayor for finance and the man who
handpicked Woodbridge for the job. Says Axelson: "All
the objectives and obstacles, all the political differences
one might expect at every stage of such a vast municipal
undertaking were effectively swept aside through legislative mandate. For example, we were asking the city
council to appropriate $16 million. Normally, this would
have resulted in prolonged debate. In this case, there was
not time for debate. There was no alternative to the
program we were proposing."
That sense of direction is one major reason why, according to Axelson, the project was able to succeed where
others might have failed. "Failure to succeed," he said,
"would have been a mark against all of those involved. It
was an important measure of the managerial skills of the
city and of the will and determination of the political
community, as well as the supportive business community,
to cope with the city's fiscal problem."
Steve Clifford puts it more succinctly: "It is important to
remember that this was an election year, if my boss Jay
Goldin, the comptroller, had wanted to make an issue
out of this mess, he certainly could have. It wouldn't have
been a very big issue, but it would have involved the same
old charges of continued mismanagement, a waste of $16
million, et cetera, et cetera. In this connection, it is
important to realize the degree of interest the press had
already shown in the project. It is very unusual for a system
to have that sort of visibility, that sort of pressure. What
that meant was that we really got whatever we wanted."
What exactly was it that the architects of IFMS wanted?
"From the outset," Clifford answers, "we wanted to
devise a system that was able to control the city budget.
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This was the most critical function. There was no way
under the existing system to assure that the budget would
remain in balance., but we wanted to make it possible
without handcuffing the managers of city agencies. You
can always impose such rigid budget controls that managers can't get their jobs done; but we sought to increase
their discretion, their flexibility of operation. Obviously a
fundamental goai was to establish proper accounting
procedures for the city agencies. This, however, was not
enough. We also wanted to improve the information
available, to help them make managerial decisions that
depended on accounting procedures and control systems."
Given the ambitious nature of these goals, then, and the
collapsing time frame in which the IFMS co-directors had
to work, it became clear that working procedures must be
radically different.
"To give us a running start," says Woodbridge, "outside
consultants were brought in. They had the expertise we
needed to solve organizational problems as they arose—or
before they arose." Altogether, five outside firms played
separate but interrelated roles in shaping the organization
of IFMS. American Management Systems had already
done work with the city in other areas of computer
systems development. Bradford National had both the
hardware and the experience to set up the potentially
unwieldly city payroll system,
"Two accounting firms worked closely with us," says
Woodbridge. "Touche Ross and Ernst & Ernst. The former
proved especially useful in anticipating and coping with
operational problems arising in the office of management
and budget (OMB) and the comptroller's office. Also, the
Urban Academy did a whale of a job in undertaking
training in all levels at the outset of the program.
"There was no sense of competition among the consulting firms," adds Woodbridge. "There wasn't time for that.
Each group recognized what its own contributions should
be and what it might expect of the others."
Representatives of the consulting firms, for their part,
cite yet another reason for the program's success—namely, Woodbridge and Clifford themselves. "I think Steve
and Dave just did a superb job in managing the project,
making hard decisions in overseeing ail the work all the
time," says Harvey Susswein, project director for American
Management Systems. "They also ran interference for all
us outside consultants, which, in turn, permitted us to do a
more effective job. What they did, essentially, was establish a new city agency on three months' notice."
"They were an excellent team," agrees Frank Zolfo.
"Clifford took the role of looking at things from an

overall macro level, and Woodbridge looked at things at a
micro and detailed level. They coordinated with one
another very well. They kept each other informed, and I
don't think the project could have been done by either of
them alone."
Axelson notes a singularly interesting aspect of this
relationship. "Dave Woodbridge and Steve Clifford are
two very different types of personalities," he points out,
"with different backgrounds and different working styles.
Yet they worked so well together that their leadership
gave the whole project the sense of unity it needed for
success."
Still, there were serious doubts that the project would
be successful.
"1 suppose the reasons for such skepticism," says Axelson, "were twofold. First of all, nothing of this magnitude
had ever been accomplished—especially not in this time
;
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"From the outset, we wanted
to devise a system that was able
to control the city budget.
77
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frame. Then, too, it was common knowledge that New
York City's bureaucracy supposedly was hopelessly inefficient and incompetent. Hence, if private industry had
never been able to bring off something of this sort, it was
inconceivable that it could be done in the public sector."
Two operational factors seem to have been responsible
for the remarkable success of IFMS. The first is implicit in
Woodbridge's attitude toward "breaking all the rules of
the book." TR's Gerald R. Riso, New York partner and
project director from 8-1-77 to the present, describes
Woodbridge himself "as a man with skill at organizing data
systems techniques. To the extent that Woodbridge felt it
necessary to break out of this mold, he demonstrated not
only the technical proficiency, but the sense of urgency
for getting the job done." Of Clifford, Riso notes some
modification of style as well: "He never lost sight of the
overriding objectives—namely, to make things work. He
was capable of making on-the-spot decisions, yet backing
down from those decisions anytime it could be demonstrated to him that the negative consequences outweighed
the positive. In short, he was a businessman in an environment that wasn't used to it."
While decisions were being made all along the way,

there remained the need to train a vast crew of 7,500 city
personnel at all working levels. The decision was made
early to formulate an entirely new system of operation.
"Looking back," says Sandi Manilla, chief of the division
of financial planning in the comptroller's office, "it would
have been otherwise impossible to motivate three or four
thousand people to do new jobs in new ways." This meant
the clerical staffs at each city agency had to be trained, not
only to perform new functions but to think in new
directions.
How successful was this motivational effort?
"There were some older people," says Manilla, "who
took their retirements rather than adapt. But, by and large,
the staffs adjusted well. Not without the usual grumblings,
naturally. Nobody particularly likes change; but, when
you can show them how much easier their jobs will be as a
result of the change, they are a lot more willing to make
the effort."
With proper training and motivation, the newly constructed system emerged unscathed, and the curtain went
up on July 1. "Despite all predictions of doom, there were
no May-day strikes, no fouled-up purchase orders," says
Susswein. "In fact, we managed under IFMS to achieve,
initially, an 80 percent acceptance rate on documents
processed through the system, compared with an expected 50 percent error rate. And, by the second pass, we
generally had that rate over the 95 percent mark."
Now in place, the "integrated" system means that city
planners will have good numbers on which to base their
estimates and control functions. "Certainly," says Riso, "if
city officials want to, they can still play with numbers; they
can still create problems by being unrealistic about revenue estimates, the probability of securing grants and such.
However, the presumption from the start was that people
wanted to do their job on the basis of accurate information, and these people are now going to be able to do a
better job. So the will to use controls is up to the agency
managers and, indeed, to the top levels of city government."
It was a hectic two years for city personnel. So much so
that the implementation has been almost anticlimactic.
"During the week before July 1," says Pat Hardiman,
assistant to the city's chief accountant, "we were all pretty
much geared up for misses and near-misses and a lot of
overtime, trying to iron out whatever bugs developed
once the system was in place. Then came the big d a y . . .
well., .no big bugs, no overtime. In fact, we simply went
home at five o'clock, which was something we hadn't
done in weeks.
"So what else is there to say? It worked,"—K.P.
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The Consultant's
View

Little has been written about the reorganization of New
York City's financial management systems from the
consultant's point of view. This has in part been deliberate.
One of the major objectives of the reorganization has
been to establish the city's own credibility—for its people,
its structure, its systems.
"The city's success was to be our success," says John
McCreight, the first of three partners to be responsible for
the Touche Ross role in the reorganization. "And our first
objective in late 1975 was to enable the city to tell the
financial community to be patient until 1977, that fiscal
changes were on the way."
What occurred behind the consultants' doors during
this $16 million effort by New York City? Clearly, a major
challenge to the professionals of all five consulting firms
was the deadline—July 1,1977—for putting the city's
records into auditable shape. This left but 18 months to
accomplish what The New York Times has termed "perhaps one of the most important reforms in city government in this century."
Frank Zolfo, second Touche Ross partner to head his
firm's efforts in this crucial period, compares the experience with running a 26-mile marathon. "Most of us were
physically tired at the end and mentally tired, and 1 think
the city people were as well." Adds Touche Ross manager Neil Thall, "We're talking about something like 150,000
man-hours for Touche Ross alone—probably the largest
systems operation ever conducted in so short a time."
The time pressure was compounded by the complex
environment the consultants had to work in. Manager
Richard Stanton, quiet and friendly behind a built-in
frown, describes "working with a client who often did not
know how its own systems worked. That is, a few city
people knew the general flow of the manual systems, but
they were not familiar with the details—while clerks would
simply process a form without knowing where it came
from or where it went next. And the information available
was often wrong. It was extremely difficult to build the
master files on which to base our work."
Moreover, four of the five consultants were not only
seeking the same information, they were also reviewing
each other's work. Partner Gerald Riso currently leads the
Touche Ross implementation work for the city with a low

key approach that contrasts to the intensity supplied by
Zolfo during the critical months. "At first, I wondered if
there were not more problems than it was worth—asking
consultants from five firms to work together in an equal
partnership. Would they admit a problem to a competitor,
such as a failure to meet a deadline? But equality worked.
And city officials told me that it gave them a sense of
participation, a knowledge of what was going on that was
important to them. Happily, they were dealing with people who adhered to high professional standards, people
driven to get the job done."
Coordinating upwards of 200 consultants from five firms
and three major city offices was another concern. According to Frank Zolfo, his consultants attended 30 to 40
meetings daily just to keep their activities integrated to a
constantly changing situation. O n a more formal basis,
representatives from each consulting firm and the city met
once a week to review developments. In addition, Touche
Ross assigned one staff person to interface with an equal at
each consulting firm. Indeed, the firms were always alert
to upcoming changes in the strategy and plans of the other
organizations. When it came to Touche Ross' own 35 to 40
consultants keeping in touch with each other, says Zolfo,
"we lived with tape recorders in our pockets. Being tied
up at evening sessions, we were constantly taping the day's
activities to let the left hand know what the right hand was
doing,"
Overall this activity hung the possibility that the state
legislature's July 1,1977 deadline would not be met—that
the new system would break down in a cloud of smoke
and the dismantled old system would not be available to
replace it. The consequence of firemen, policemen, and
others not getting paid, for example, was a development
the city dreaded to face. Thus, Touche Ross put together a
team that worked for four months on a contingency
plan—a fact that was little known because the plan was
never used.
Meanwhile, New York City employees—long used to
seeing consultants ask questions, project new ideas, and
then disappear without causing a ripple of change discovered that this time the consultants were not going
away. Unlike in private industry, where management
decides whether or not to exceed the budget, in the

public sector the budget is law. The consultants were
engaged to assure that the law was followed.
The city's fiscal problems in the mid-70s had been
compounded by budget improprieties. For example, vocational education expenses might be included in the capita!
budget, rather than the expense budget where they belonged. The theory was that benefits would be enjoyed by
students for years to come. "Under a capital budget, if $40
million were raised by 20-year bonds," explains senior
consultant Ira Feinberg, "only $2 or $3 million would need
to be paid that year rather than the entire $40 million."
Tall, with curly hair, Feinberg has the relaxed, casual
manner typical of the new breed of consultants. "Also,
controls were minimal. Expenses would be broken down
by their purpose—such as snow removal, which might cut
across several agencies—instead of being under one department responsible for the activity."
To make the city's records auditable, the entire new
system had to work within the framework of generally
accepted accounting principles. Neil Thai I, a slight, neatly
tailored Touche Ross manager, worked in the comptroller's office, "Our job was to determine how applying
accounting principles would impact our control of the
city's finances. Which revenues could be accrued and
which could be accounted for on a cash basis? How would
the accounting be handled for such items as bonds and
sales tax revenues in the financial statements of the
Municipal Assistance Corporation (MAC) Fund? How
would we account for the fact that pension fund administrators were two years behind in calculating pension
liabilities? The questions went on and on."
The biggest challenge, Thall states, was to establish
consistent principles that were understandable, "Formerly
the financial statements ran up to 500 pages and were
completely incomprehensible. You had to be an insider to
understand what a line of information meant. The comptroller's office eliminated three-quarters of that material
and set up an understandable and consistent statement to
which we then applied the figures for fiscal 76 and fiscal
77. This was to give the official 78 audit under the new
system a base to compare its figures to,"
The consultants' world of accounting, budgeting, and
systems was held together in New York City by an idea
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called IFMS. Pronounced "iffmiss," it is the acronym for
integrated financial management system—in simple terms
a computerized system in which a change in the amounts
for one agency or department hooked into the system will
impact all other departments affected by that change.
Ira Feinberg explains the key encumbrance concept that
grew out of the IFMS. "That was an innovation. When a
purchase order is placed, the money is reserved, or
encumbered, in the budget center—there are 1,000 such
centers—responsible for the purchase. Thus, a purchase
order can be stopped from going out whenever it causes
that budget category to be exceeded."
Altogether, the IFMS project has required the development of 20 general procedure manuals, 60 operation
manuals for the user agencies, and 10 manuals for the
operation of the computerized information system. To
some of the consultants, the time spent preparing such
manuals did not offer a major intellectual challenge. Frank
Zolfo agrees that "it was not the type of analytical work
they enjoy, perhaps, but there was certainly an intellectual
challenge in writing a set of manuals that city people could
understand, that provided the controls needed, and that
would provide a system that worked." Clearly, keeping
the professional staff stimulated and not bogged down in
detail was a constant challenge to project managers.
There were 7,500 people on the city's staff who had to
be trained in the new system. What was the caliber, the
commitment of these city personnel? There is no clear
answer. Feinberg describes a group of budget examiners,
"young college grad types," who were highly cooperative,
while other members of the city's staff did not care to
learn a new way of doing things. Thall cites a dozen people
in the comptroller's office "who were motivated, who
really wanted to help, who spent a Sot of overtime hours
on the project—and they are the ones who are going to be
running the comptroller's office from now on. Sandi
Manilla, for example, got right in there and called a spade
a spade; she wasn't afraid of going after people who
weren't doing things correctly. Pat Hardiman was another
excellent person."
The challenge, says Feinberg, was to establish credibility
with city people. "For example, you could not get in front
of 30 budget examiners and give a typical consulting
presentation with transparencies. You had to learn to sit
back and let people blow off steam, which wasn't directed
at you but at their own frustrations. You had to understand
where they were coming from. And you never said, here is
the solution that will save the city; you described six ways
to do a job and then got them to agree that one was the
easiest or most effective. It was important to preplan the
meeting, to know who was coming, what their points of
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view would be, and who were the one or two people
whose opinion really mattered."
"At first," notes Gerald Riso, "some consultants were
prejudiced against municipal employees. Some of us
doubted they were sufficiently motivated or smart enough
to make the new system work. But the answer to this is that
today the new system is working. The data is accurate,
reports are coming out when they are supposed to, and
the right information is getting to the right people."
Thus, the city did not go up in smoke and recrimination
on July 1,1977. Riso sums up the basic achievements:
"First, a single system, not a separate set of books, now
exists for the mayor and the comptroller. Second, the city's
accounting policies are in accord with generally accepted
accounting principles. And, third, sound financial planning is possible—because there are budget and purchasing controls, and because you cannot take credit any more
for revenue that does not exist."
"What is not sure," adds Frank Zolfo, "is whether the
people who run the city are going to use the system
properly. Are Koch and his team going to have the
courage and wisdom to make the right choices?" If they
do not, he suggests, "people who are outside looking in
are going to have a much clearer sense of what is happening in their city—and that may not be a bad thing, either."
Assuming the system is used, how much will it impact
the city's financial crisis? Gerald Riso believes the problems of New York City go beyond the scope of its IFMS
project. "The city must also ask itself if it should be in the
health care and education businesses. Should it provide
services or contract for them? Is it taxing the right people?
Are its labor negotiations sound? What IFMS can do is help
the city to respond to those issues, and, if so, it will have
paid off even more."
When John McCreight assumed responsibility for
Touche Ross' initial involvement in the city's fiscal crisis,
he was asked: will the patient die? His answer: the patient
is not the physical presence of New York City, nor is it the
city administration. "It is the people who live and work in
the city. And the patient is alive and well. The administration may go through hell, and perhaps people in the
administration will die. But the patient itself will not die."
"I'm not a native New Yorker," says Neil Thall, "but it's
my home now, and I feel an affinity for this city. I often
look at the consulting jobs I do and the clients I work with,
and I ask myself if what I am doing is having a positive
impact on society. Well, on this New York City project, I
really believe I helped the city. I honestly feel I impacted it
and caused positive change. I was helping my community
and it felt good. I met a lot of people who will be important
some day in this city, and they feel the same way."—R.P.

